The Realities Of Nuclear Power
As promised in my
earlier post, I will delve into the politics (i.e. realities) of nuclear power in the U.S. and the forces that may make it difficult to revive the nuclear power industry.
Despite many of the uninformed or false claims made by those opposed to nuclear power, it may be one of the best hopes that we have to ensure a stable and reliable supply of energy for the foreseeable future. It has the advantages of being non-polluting, generating no greenhouse gasses, except of course for those created by the machinery used to mine, refine, and transport the nuclear fuel. New technology and better designs make the idea of expanding nuclear power attractive to many, but not to all.
A very vocal minority has twisted the facts, exaggerated the risks, and downplayed the benefits. They have played upon the people’s fears, knowing that many of them have little understanding of nuclear technology. All the people know is that nuclear power is a Bad Thing. They may not know why, but someone told them it was bad. These are the same people that think nothing of living downwind from a coal-fired power plant, even though the effluvia from that plant is affecting their health every single day.
Let’s take a look at the various arguments that have been used to stifle the further use of nuclear power.
It’s too dangerous. A meltdown like Chernobyl or Three Mile Island could kill millions.
This is the most often used reason cited as an argument against nuclear power. The two worst nuclear accidents known (There were others during the early years of nuclear energy research in the Soviet Union that were hushed up) did
not kill millions of people. Though the potential for many times the deaths that
actually occurred at Chernobyl was there, they didn’t happen. Nobody died and nobody was injured at Three Mile Island.
Chernobyl is the perfect example of how not to build a nuclear reactor and how not to staff it. Whether it was Soviet arrogance, cost containment, or outright incompetence, the RBMK type reactor at Chernobyl was an inherently unstable design, had inadequate safety systems, a flammable moderator (graphite), and no containment vessel. It was a disaster waiting to happen. The staff ignored safety procedures, disabled the emergency cooling systems, and shut down the primary cooling in the core. It seems they did everything they could to cause the fire in the core that led to the meltdown and release of radionucleides.
Three Mile Island showed that U.S. designs did what they were supposed to do, in spite of the errors made by the humans in the control room. There was little radiological release, and what there was was low-level gas vented from the containment. Less than a mile away it wasn’t even detectable. The system worked.
Systems in the remaining nuclear plants in the U.S. have been upgraded, making the possibility of a repeat of the accident at Three Mile Island extremely small. Newer technology has been added, making for more positive control and for better backup systems. Older second-generation plants have been decommissioned rather than upgraded.
Then there’s all of that nuclear waste. We have no way to deal with it, therefore we shouldn’t create any more of it.
The matter of nuclear waste and how to deal with it is purely a political issue,
not a technical one. The best way to get the most bang for the buck when it comes to nuclear fuel is to reprocess it, making even more fuel available. Instead, we hold it in pools at power plants, or bury it.
Though many think that burying it is a poor idea, there are ways to do it safely. The technology exists to glassify the waste, rendering it solid and insoluble. Though the glassified waste won’t remain that way forever, it will stay that way long enough for the radioactive elements to decay to less harmful elements. Of course, if the fuel were reprocessed, most of the waste to be disposed of would be relatively short-lived radioactive isotopes. Most would decay away in a single human lifetime rather than 25,000 years (the half-life of plutonium).
Terrorists could steal the nuclear fuel or nuclear waste and use it to make atomic bombs.
First, the nuclear material of the type used in power plants is not the same as is used to make nuclear warheads. The nuclear fuel for power reactors is uranium oxide. Warheads use either highly enriched uranium or plutonium. Second, the spent nuclear fuel does have plutonium in it, but it is still mixed in with the uranium oxide making up the fuel assemblies. It takes a lot of equipment to separate out the plutonium from the uranium. Third, unless the terrorists direct have access to the power plants and a lot of time while they are there they will be unable to obtain any fissile material from the U.S.. Hijacking a fuel shipment is damn near impossible.
Before you ask why, have you seen
how fuel assemblies are moved to and from nuclear power plants? The fuel assemblies are inside large steel and lead casks about the size of a one-car garage. The casks are moved about on a low boy trailer at low speed (probably not over 25 or 30 mph on a straight and level road). The fuel assemblies and cask weigh between 25 and 40 tons, not something easy to steal or hide. If the fuel is being moved by rail, then the cask and assemblies weigh up to 125 tons. It’s not like a terrorist group can hold up the convoy, unload the fuel assemblies into the back of a panel truck, and then drive off. Stealing the tractor-trailer itself might buy them some time, but it isn’t something that they will be able to speed away in, is it?
Nuclear plants are too damn expensive and they never pay for themselves.
I’ve heard this one again and again. It wasn’t until the 1980’s that construction costs for nuclear plants soared out of control. The question is, why? There were a number of factors.
One of the more obvious, though less of a factor in the cost spiral, was simply, politics.
Anti-nuclear groups fought the planning, construction, licensing, and running of nuclear power plants. Court orders, ex post facto government hearings, demonstrations, attempted occupations of construction sites, and other delaying tactics caused the owners and constructors of the plants considerable sums of money to counter. State governments and politicians also got into the act.
In one instance, the New Hampshire gubernatorial race was won by a man promising to lower the electric rates in his state by outlawing what was called CWIP (pronounced “quip”) charges, or Construction Works In Progress charges. CWIP was a way for the local electric utilities to finance the construction of new generation facilities. A small additional fee was added to the monthly electric bill and the monies collected used for construction projects. In this case the man, Hugh Gallen, became the governor and followed through on his campaign promise: he pushed through legislation that abolished CWIP charges. That meant that the utility now had to borrow far more money than it had originally planned at a time when interest rates were above 16%. The electricity rates did go down for a little while. But by the time the project was completed, New Hampshire ended up with some of the highest electric rates in the lower 48 states (17 cents per kWh!).
Another factor that added to the cost of building nuclear plants was the construction method. Each plant in the U.S. was built on site, one beam, one bolt, and one weld at a time. Each plant built in the U.S. was a custom design, with no two plants alike. With few exceptions, prefabricated modular construction of a standardized design was not used. If automobiles were built that way, very few people could afford them and they would be difficult to repair because each replacement part would be hand crafted. Some of what drove the ‘custom built’ approach was scale. Modular construction lends itself to smaller plants, under 900 megawatts in capacity. Many of the plants built after the 50’s and 60’s were 1000 megawatts or larger. This is a case where economy of scale doesn’t apply. Using modular construction of standardized design, two plants could be built for the cost of one ‘mega’-plant, with the total capacity of the two smaller plants being greater than the single large plant. Construction time is also far less, and as any economist knows, time is money.
A third factor was what I call ‘redos’. This is what happens when a plant under construction has to redo a portion of the plant already completed or near completion because the U.S. government decides that this new widget or that new gadget must be installed, or something must be moved over 3/16” to the left. The construction firm must redo the work, adding to the costs and pushing out the time of completion. It’s one thing if the design change was critical to the safe operation of the plant, but in too many cases it was a matter of “Because we told you to do it!”
Not exactly the way to run
any business, is it?
Many of the third (present) generation plants have exceptional operational records. Other than shutdowns for routine maintenance and refueling (about once every 18 months to two years) the plants run 24/7 at up to 100% power. Oil, coal, and natural gas fueled plants have nowhere near that kind of operational record. Greenhouse gas emissions from the nuclear plant power generation is
zero. The only other type of large scale power plant having that kind of record is hydro, and we’ve built hydro just about everywhere it is feasible to do so. The cost of operation for nuclear plants is less than that for fossil-fueled plants. In fuel costs alone,
nuclear is cheaper than fossil by a factor of three (0.52 cents per kilowatt-hour for nuclear versus 1.56 cents per kilowatt-hour for fossil).
Overall operating costs (operations, maintenance, and fuel) for nuclear power plants in the U.S. were 2.13 cents per kWh in 1998, with a downward trend since 1988. That trend is expected to continue.
But nuclear power is bad for children and other living things!
This is the emotional factor, not backed up by any data or anything resembling the truth. Nuclear power makes people nervous because they’ve been told it’s bad, that it will rot their bones, make everyone sterile, cause them to go bald, cause impotence, give them bad breath, erase their computer’s hard drive, cause their daughter to pierce her navel, and make disco come back. They consider any risk of nuclear power too risky, no matter how low the probability of a problem.
It’s a matter of perception, of perspective, and not reality. No amount of data will convince them that at any minute the nuclear plant near their home
isn’t going to explode and spew invisible death. These are the same people that think nothing of getting in to their car and driving, even though the risk of them getting injured or killed in an accident is many millions of times greater than being injured or killed by a meltdown. The Big Mac they eat at lunch is a far greater risk to them than a nuclear power plant. But that doesn’t stop them from driving their gas guzzling SUV or eating at McDonald’s.
The
future of nuclear power is up in the air. New power plants will be less expensive because the technology has gotten better, cheaper, and does more.
New reactor designs are less expensive to build and even safer than the third-generation reactors. Some fourth-generation designs are meltdown proof. Some of these new technologies include:
- Gas cooled fast reactors
- Lead alloy liquid metal-cooled reactor systems
- Molten salt reactor systems
- Sodium liquid metal-cooled reactor systems
- Supercritical water-cooled reactor systems
- Pebble bed very high temperature gas-cooled reactor systems
It is not a question of if new nuclear plants will be built, but a question of when. Despite what many of the anti-nuclear groups say, the only viable high-density power sources that can power our modern era are nuclear. Too many of the alternative technologies have deficiencies, as Stephen Den Beste has
pointed out.